Strategy identifies China as ‘the most consequential and systemic challenge’, while Russia as posing ‘acute threats’ both to vital US national interests abroad and to the homeland
The unclassified version of the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) has pitched for the Department of Defense increasing collaboration with the private sector in priority areas, “especially with the commercial space industry, leveraging its technological advancements and entrepreneurial spirit to enable new capabilities.”
The strategy, released by the DoD on Thursday (October 27), details the department’s path forward. In particular, it identifies China as the “pacing challenge” for the department.
“The PRC [People’s Republic of China] presents the most consequential and systemic challenge, while Russia poses acute threats — both to vital US national interests abroad and to the homeland,” Secretary of Defense, Lloyd J. Austin III, said while releasing the strategy.
The NDS, which is in line with the broader national security strategy released by the White House on October 12, notes that both China and Russia are already using non-kinetic means against the defense industrial base and mobilization systems of the United States. The document also draws attention to the counterspace capabilities of the two nations that can target the Global Positioning System (GPS) and other US space-based capabilities that support military power and daily civilian life.
Threats to space-based assets
This concern is valid in the face of repeated threats from Russia to “strike” Western satellites. Just a few days ago, a senior Russian official had threatened that commercial Western satellites could be shot down as payback for aiding Ukraine in the war. “Quasi-civilian infrastructure may be a legitimate target for a retaliatory strike,” Konstantin Vorontsov, deputy director of the Russian foreign ministry’s department for non-proliferation and arms control,told the UN First Committee.
Vorontsov also argued that the use of commercial satellites to aid Ukraine in the war “violates” the Outer Space Treaty, warning this could start a “full-fledged arms race in outer space”.
Vorontsov had made similar remarks last month at the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs working group.
Russia (and China’s) anti-satellite missile (ASAT) capabilities have been a concern for some time now. In November 2021, Russia destroyed one of its own defunct satellites, creating a field of at least 1,500 trackable pieces of debris in low orbit and threatening space operations and human spaceflight, drawing condemnation from around the world.
Further, Russia then claimed on state television that this new ASAT missile capability means “that if NATO crosses our red line, it risks losing all 32 of its GPS satellites at once.”
Commercial satellites led by the US space industry have been at the forefront of reporting on the war in Ukraine and giving details about the Russian atrocities. Be it the high-resolution imagery providing information 24×7, or SAR satellites providing night-time images or at times with cloud cover, or satellites that can monitor radio frequency (RF) to uncover troop movements or GPS jamming, the intelligence fuelling the information war between Russia and the NATO is not coming from state actors alone, but from a cross section of private geospatial intelligence providers, Maxar Technologies and BlackSky being the prominent ones.
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Additionally, towards the very beginning of the war, Elon Musk had donated roughly 20,000 Starlink satellites to Ukraine, which have proved to be vital to Kyiv for troop communication in their battle against Russia. Musk has already said his satellites have been targeted by cyberwarfare attacks.
Vulnerabilities of the GPS
Weaknesses in the GPS have been a big headache for some time now for both the DoD and the Department of Transportation as it is found that GPS signals can be easily blocked, jammed or spoofed. A 2019 report sponsored by the National Institute of Standards and Technology estimated the loss of GPS would cost the U.S. economy USD 1 billion a day, while failing many of the critical services such as telecom and transportation.
And now, an increased risk of cyberattack has raised concerns about the safety of GPS satellites.
Shortly before the Russian invasion started in February, there were massive GPS interference along the Ukraine-Belarus border, HawkEye 360 had revealed in March, while calling it a demonstration of the “integration of electronic warfare tactics into Russian military operation to further degrade Ukraine’s ability for self-defense”.
To address the weaknesses in the GPS, several possible backups are in development.
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Cybersecurity threats
On the other hand, China’s cyber threats have also long been a matter of grave concern.
While the FBI have been warning about this for a long time now, a recent alert from the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) says: “PRC state-sponsored cyber actors continue to exploit known vulnerabilities to actively target US and allied networks as well as software and hardware companies to steal intellectual property and develop access into sensitive networks.”
Earlier in June, CISA and FBI had issued warnings over China-backed cyber threats against the telecom industry, saying small office/home office (SOHO) routers and network attached storage (NAS) devices were particularly vulnerable to network intrusions.
Accordingly, the NDS observes that “in the cyber and space domains, the risk of inadvertent escalation is particularly high due to unclear norms of behavior and escalation thresholds, complex domain interactions, and new capabilities.”
Further, there is also apprehension that new applications of artificial intelligence (AI), quantum science, autonomy, biotechnology, and space technologies have the potential to disrupt day-to-day US supply chain and logistics operations.
“The PRC employs state-controlled forces, cyber and space operations, and economic coercion against the United States and its Allies and partners. Russia employs disinformation, cyber, and space operations against the United States and our Allies and partners, and irregular proxy forces in multiple countries,” the NDS notes.
Climate Change and other transboundary challenges
Beyond state and non-state actors, the NDS also believes that changes in global climate and other dangerous transboundary threats.
“Climate change is basing and creating new corridors of strategic interaction, particularly in the Arctic region,” it notes, adding that this increases the demands, including on the Joint Force, for disaster response and defense support of civil authorities, and affect security relationships with some Allies and partners.
The Arctic is a significant area of concern in this regard, and the DoD plans to deter threats from and through this region by improving early warning and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. This also includes partnering with Canada to enhance the capabilities of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), to improve early warning surveillance for potential incursions or attacks originating from any direction into North America.
The NDS also underlines that the United States is working with its other allies and partners to increase shared maritime domain awareness in the Arctic and the Indo-Pacific region.
In May this year, QUAD – the group of countries that includes United States, India, Australia and Japan – launched a satellite-based initiative to help countries in the region better monitor the waters on their shores and, in turn, to uphold a free and open Indo-Pacific. While not explicitly stated, this was clearly an effort to counter China. China’s violations of international waters isn’t just a geopolitical risk, but also endangers maritime sustainability, ecology, and the livelihood of communities dependent on fishing.
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The NDS underlines that the DoD will prioritize building resilience in the cyber and space domains to empower the entire Joint Force. While cyber resilience will be enhanced by modern encryption and a zero-trust architecture, in the space domain, the DoD will reduce adversary incentives for early attack by fielding diverse, resilient, and redundant satellite constellations.
“We will bolster our ability to fight through disruption by improving defensive capabilities and increasing options our ability to fight through disruption by improving defensive capabilities and increasing options,” it notes.
