



NAVIGATION GNSS-DENIED WITH TRUST




**INDO PACIFIC
GE INTELLIGENCE FORUM**
2-3 June 2026 | Manekshaw Centre, New Delhi




CONTEXT – ELECTRONIC WARFARE

Our customers operate in environments where navigation is actively attacked, not just “disturbed”
GNSS is not a guarantee: it can be missing or misleading


> 900 reported spoofing / day



2022



2026



MECHANISMS OF DEGRADATION

Two primary threats that significantly degrade GNSS and will drive our product strategy



Jamming

Intentional RF interference

Overpowering signals with noise. The receiver "hears" nothing but static.

Signal Lost



Spoofing

Corrupted GNSS data

Broadcasting fake signals. The receiver calculates a valid but false position.

Position Faked

Distinct threats requiring distinct countermeasures

Spoofing resilience – in practice

1 Jamming & Spoofing starts

2 GNSS position « lost »


3 Some incorrect fix GNSS



4 GNSS fully Spoofed

INS trajectory Not spoofed

5 Spoofing ended



Where does it matters ?

**Ai
r**



**Lan
d**



**Marin
e**



**Loi t er i ng
Muni ti ons**



**I SR
Dr ones**



C- UAS



UGV



RCWS



**Opt r oni
cs &
Radar**



**Aut onous
Sur f ace**



**Aut onous
Under wat er**



Drone strike Typical mission profile

Take Off point
GNSS available

Jamming / Spoofing areas

Inertial drift

GNSS recovery

Flight with some regular
evasion maneuvers

Inertial drift

Target


Interceptor UAV Typical mission profile

Homing phase
Seeker-based guidance
Very high dynamics (sharp turns & accelerations)



Target approach phase
High speed mostly straight lines

Take Off point
No GNSS



ISR UAV


Typical mission profile

Reconnaissance phase
High altitude, low velocity in
GNSS contested area

Initial approach

Return to base

Take Off point
GNSS available



How do we achieve performance?





Air data aiding
(Airspeed & altitude)




Visual odometry
(generic velocity aiding)



Alternative radio nav / Visual position
(generic position aiding)




LEAN **CRP**



Antennas

Drivers



Controlling the drone

Autopilot

SAF2NAV RESULTS

Real world dead reckoning tests - UAV





Figure 6: 2D position error - air data aided


Pure MEMS INS → >100 m error after 10 min (@160km/h)

MEMS INS + Vision → < 50 m over 60 km (@800km/h)

Spoofing tests (jammertest) - Land




Test with visual navigation system - UAV



CHALLENGES

IT'S ALL ABOUT PARTNERSHIP AND JOINT DEVELOPMENT





SBG SYSTEMS

motion and navigation you can trust