Our world increasingly depends on satellite technologies. Not only do commercial satellites provide a vital link in the global ecosystem of data sharing, but they also provide the technological basis for the GPS, and are therefore crucial as sources of geospatial data.
It’s also been apparent for many years, however, that our satellites are fragile, and could be knocked out by a determined adversary. Plans for anti-satellite weapons were, of course, a feature of the closing years of the Cold War, but now it seems they are back in vogue. A report released this month indicates that Russia is testing Anti-Satellite (ASAT) and Direct Ascent Anti-Satellite (DA-ASAT) technologies that could threaten Spacecraft in Low-Earth Orbit (LEO), and eventually, Geostationary Orbit (GEO).
These reports are concerning, especially at a time when the number of satellites is set to increase significantly, and it is becoming clear that Space traffic management will be crucial to protect our satellite infrastructure. As threats against commercial infrastructure increase, some fear that satellites – and the services they provide – could be the source and prize for a second round of the Cold War.
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A growing threat
First, let’s look at the most imminent threat. In an April 2021 report, “Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source Assessment,” co-authors Brian Weeden and Victoria Samson claim to have uncovered evidence that Russia is working on a new generation of anti-satellite technology. These systems are based on Cold War-era weapons, but are far more sophisticated than the weapons of that period.
At the moment, the system’s ability to directly attack satellites appears to be fairly limited. The researchers note that, despite the deployment of tow “sub-satellites” in low, high-velocity orbits, at the moment the system has a limited range. Specifically, the missiles used in the system can only reach Low Earth Orbit (LEO). The majority of high-value satellites are in much higher geosynchronous orbits.
That might not be the end of the story, though, because the ability to directly attack satellites is not all that analysts are worried about. As any good end-of-the-world movie will tell you, destruction of the orbiting device might not be the actual goal. Russia’s new system might be focused on something more subtle and potentially more dangerous – takeover and surveillance.
Multi-lateral aggression
Indeed, put this most recent report into a broader context, and it is immediately apparent that Russia’s tests are part of a continuing, worldwide exploration of anti-satellite technologies. The findings of the most recent report are backed up, for instance, in a report by the US Space Force that claims that Russia has already tested missiles capable of destroying LEO satellites.
Similar reports have found that China has conducted multiple tests of RPO technologies in both LEO and GEO, which could lead to co-orbital ASAT capabilities, and that the US has conducted multiple RPO tests in both LEO and GEO that could lead to a co-orbital ASAT capability. At the moment there is no evidence of an operational system.
At first glance, it may seem like these systems are merely technological experiments, with limited real-world utility. However, there is good reason to fear that – at a time of heightened geopolitical tensions – merely having these systems represents a temptation that states may find it difficult to resist.
In fact, one only needs to look at the recent history of state-sponsored cyberattacks to see that satellites will soon become a prime target for intra-state economic warfare. Over the past few years, state actors have increasingly targeted each others’ economic infrastructure, with ports and airports having become a favorite target for cyberattacks.
The value of these attacks – for those who launch them – is two-fold. On one hand, knocking out a port or airport can result in huge, lasting economic damage for the state affected. On the other, the source of such attacks is often impossible to trace, especially if state actors are working via proxies and shadowy hacker groups.
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The future of satellite systems
At this point, you may begin to see why so many analysts are worried about our satellites. Contemporary satellites are complex machines that can be destroyed by a cyberattack as well as by more conventional weapon systems. Similarly, it seems clear that some of the capabilities now being developed are designed to spy on these satellites and not merely to destroy them.
For the state sponsoring such an attack, the advantages are clear. Satellites now carry enormous amounts of valuable data – because of this, knocking out a satellite could lead to significant economic damage, and intercepting the data could be lucrative in itself.
Furthermore, given the limited visibility that most states have when it comes to Space communications, tracing the source of such an attack could prove almost impossible.
For that reason, many see the future of the satellite business as being radically different from the past. With the risk of intra-state attacks on the increase, satellite makers will be increasingly encouraged to focus on resilience and security. That might ultimately result in a global system of geospatial data which is more secure, but it may also push up the price of accessing this system.
The bottom line
It’s important, of course, to take a balanced approach to reports that new anti-satellite weapons systems are being developed. It’s certainly unlikely that such reports are going to affect the short-term projections for the commercial satellite market. However, it’s also clear that capabilities such as those outlined in the most recent report will become standard in the years to come, and that global political tensions will therefore run the risk of escalating into attacks on satellite infrastructure.
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