Towards Coherent Indian Military Space Doctrine

Itโ€™s imperative for India to formulate a military space doctrine commensurate to its increasing heft for preempting regional security challenges, and forging deeper cooperation with Indo-Pacific countries.

To a great extent, states decide their foreign policy posture and national development priorities based on where they are located, as is illustrated by the title of Tim Marshal’s book โ€˜Prisoners of Geographyโ€™.

For India, the context of South Asia โ€“ unresolved border disputes with China and Pakistan, both nuclear states in its eastern and western flanks โ€“ renders geographic context extremely relevant and strategic in terms of capacity building in civilian as well as military domain.

Indiaโ€™s ability to utilize space for both economic and national security has become critical since the development of Chinese space capabilities and ambitions, given that such capacities can be utilized for counter-space strikes to destroy Indiaโ€™s ability to utilize its own civilian and military space assets.

Sino Space Threat

Advanced space capabilities lend support to Chinaโ€™s movement of military forces at high altitudes through its more than 250 military satellites utilized for intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), Command, Control, Communication, and targeting (C3T), as well as precision missile deployment and tracking.

China has conducted more than a hundred military exercises annually in the Tibetan plateau since 2023 where it disputed border with India is, that has included a joint effort by its Tibetan Military District (TMD), Western Theatre Command (WTC) and Xinjiang Military District (XMD).

Since 2015, Chinaโ€™s Military Strategic Guidance as well as its 2019 White Paper on National Defense have included the space domain as part of its multi-domain operations, with space capabilities forming an important component of China taking the strategic initiative in a conflict, be it in the South China Sea (SCS), East China Sea (ECS), or the China-India border areas.

In 2016, China became the first nation in the world to test a Quantum satellite, named Mecius, based on which more experiments have been conducted to develop an unhackable Quantum communications capability. China declared certain assets in space like โ€˜satellite internetโ€™ as critical infrastructure in 2020

Chinaโ€™s military space capabilities have witnessed the establishment of the Peopleโ€™s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), and development of counter-space capabilities like Anti-Satellite (ASAT) weapons, robotic arms, spoofing, jamming, dazzling and blinding, cyber-attacks on satellites, in orbit platforms augmented by Artificial Intelligence that can target adversary capabilities, laser and power beaming capabilities and electronic warfare.

What is needed is a roadmap for a military space doctrine that enables India to take advantage of its space assets towards building a resilient deterrence architecture, augmenting its partner nation capability in forums such as the QUAD

Given this clear strategic rationale for Chinaโ€™s development of space capabilities for augmenting its military space capabilities, one of the weaknesses of Indiaโ€™s own defense posture and capability is its military space capability.

Indiaโ€™s civilian space capabilities like rocket launch, satellite manufacturing, support to national development like agriculture, weather forecasting, tele-education, telemedicine, and navigation like Global Positioning System (GPS) is well known.

However, the lack of a clear national security strategy vis-ร -vis space capabilities has created strategic ambiguity, leading to a weakened global posture when it comes to deterrence in the upper Himalayas.

This also stands in the way of building a robust foundation for its naval posture in the Indian Ocean, and towards building strategic partnerships with countries like the United States, Australia, and Japan through a mechanism such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD).

Due to a lack of strategic clarity, partner nations find it difficult to ensure strategic
convergence on issues like Space Situational Awareness (SSA), space domain awareness, and towards building a joint strategic posture when it come to a free and democratic Indo-Pacific.

What is needed is a roadmap for a military space doctrine that enables India to take advantage of its space assets towards building a resilient deterrence architecture, augmenting its partner nation capability in forums such as the QUAD.

Indiaโ€™s Civilian Space Policy Posture

India established the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) in 1969. Since the beginning, state-funded and directed investments have been the thrust of Indiaโ€™s space program, geared towards national development.

Since the establishment of ISRO, India has earned a reputation as a reliable and cost-effective launch provider for a global market of satellite launches, sending hundreds of Indian-origin and foreign satellites to space since 1975.

In 2014, India became the first Asian country to reach Mars orbit. Since 2019, India has taken some significant policy decisions to privatize its space sector, and with the official Indian space policy of 2023, this has been institutionalized into a clear authorization process.

As part of Indiaโ€™s space vision in the long term, the 2023 space policy states that โ€œto augment space capabilities; enable, encourage and develop a flourishing commercial presence in space; use space as a driver of technology development and derived benefits in allied areas; pursue international relations, and create an ecosystem for effective implementation of space applications among all stakeholders.โ€

Subsequently, the vision is connected to Indiaโ€™s space goals of utilizing space for national development, national security, and economic development with a focus on peaceful development of space.

The 2023 space policy makes it clear that the strategy adopted by the government of India to develop India into a space power is via commercialization of space.

โ€œNon-Governmental Entities (NGEs) will be encouraged to engage in the commercial recovery of an asteroid resource or a space resource. Any NGE engaged in such process shall be entitled to possess, own, transport, use, and sell any such asteroid resource or space resource obtained in accordance with applicable law, including the international obligations of Indiaโ€, says the space policy document.

The Indian position on space resources is important to consider as it would imply the development of capacities to extract resources like in-space manufacturing and assembly, 3D printing, robotic capabilities, Artificial Intelligence, in space re-fueling, the development of Space Based Solar Power (SBSP), that would include power beaming, nuclear propulsion for shorter duration travel from one celestial body to another.

Such capacities require a high level of space-based communication, to include both lunar communications, specifically cislunar (Earth-Moon) space situational awareness, something that adds to military capabilities.

Also Read: Integrated Ops for Strengthening Defense Capability

Maintaining Synergy

The Indian position on space based resources is similar to two other QUAD partner nations, to include the United States with its US Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act (2015), and the 2021 Japan space resources act.

India now joins them in encouraging its private sector to engage in the extraction of space resources by creating enabling policy and regulatory structures.

The 2023 space policy directs ISRO to concentrate on Research & Development (R&D) and states that ISRO โ€œundertake studies and missions on in-situ resource utilization, celestial prospecting and other aspects of extra-terrestrial habitability.โ€

The New Space India Ltd (NSIL) that was established in 2019 will be responsible for โ€œcommercialising space technologies and platforms created through public expenditure and procure/manufacture space systems from either the public or the private sector.โ€ The Indian National Space Promotion & Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe) will function as the single-window authorization center for both public and private sector space activities.

It will include launch, operation, in-orbit slots, re-entry of space objects, and the dissemination of Earth observation data. IN-SPACe has been tasked to proactively promote private industry in order to โ€œestablish India as a preferred service provider for global requirements of products/services in the space sector.โ€ The main government entity that will implement the 2023 space policy is the Department of Space (DoS), which falls under the Prime Ministerโ€™s Office.

Harmonizing Spatial/ Space Capabilities

While Indiaโ€™s official 2023 space policy is clear regarding the urgent requirement to privatize space development to scale up Indiaโ€™s contribution to the global space economy, India needs to think seriously about its military space posture.

This is urgent because of two important strategic roles that India will be expected to play.
The first role is Indiaโ€™s partner capabilities as a key contributor to the QUAD space capabilities to ensure a free Indo-Pacific which to be successful will require joint interoperability across multiple domains to include space.

Amongst the QUAD nations, the United States possesses geospatial capabilities like electro-optical infrared imaging, earth imaging, synthetic aperture radar, electromagnetic spectrum mapping, hyperspectral, specialized satellites for missile warning and weather, and large constellations in Low Earth Orbit.

The US also has capabilities in shipping and aircraft tracking called identification tracking, and is developing space-based radar to track moving targets on land, air, and sea.

Additionally, the US is involved in wind and atmospheric tracking.

In terms of low latency and large constellations, the U.S. commercial sector plays a vital role. In 2007, Japan enacted a national geospatial policy that prioritized the development of Earth imaging, sensing, tracking, and electro-optical infrared imaging. All this falls under the purview of the Geospatial Information Authority of Japan.

In 2020, Japan established the Space Domain Mission Unit as its version of a space force, as well as an operational command.

Tokyo’s 2022 National Security Strategy, for the first time, includes space as part of its multi-domain operations, highlighting the importance of acquiring counter-strike capabilities in space for defense.

Australia aims to develop its own geospatial capabilities like Earth imaging, Precision, Navigation, Timing, and the development of launch infrastructure to include spaceports by 2030.

Australia established a Defence Space Command in 2022 in order to not only focus on the national security aspects of space but also built into inter-operability for multi-na- tional space operations.

India has its own geospatial capabilities including remote sensing, global navigation satellite system and additional geo-intelligence capabilities that add to big data, Artificial Intelligence (AI) and cyber capabilities.

In the next five years, by 2028, the QUAD will transcend from being a partnership high on rhetoric to being called upon to provide real-time support, across all domains of land, sea, air, cyber and space, to ensure that the Indo-Pacific remains free and accessible to all nations. In that context, issuing a military space doctrine is in Indiaโ€™s and the QUADโ€™s strategic interest

All these capabilities however require a grand strategic vision and clear military space doctrine, augmented by a separate space defense organization and a defense space command.

The U.S., Japan and Australia have established space commands as mentioned above, while Indiaโ€™s Defense Space Agency, established in 2019, is organized to play a proactive role in space, but not quite independent enough to develop its space expertise and knowledge base.

The lack of an Indian official national security strategy and military space doctrine further decreases its potential for joint operational capabilities.

Boosting Preparedness

In the Defense Space Symposium organized by the Indian Space Association on April 11, 2023, Indiaโ€™s Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) General Anil Chauhan stated that โ€œthe very nature of warfare is on the cusp of major transformation and what is being witnessed is militarization of space and steady progress towards weaponization, the aim for all of us should be towards developing dual-use platforms with special focus towards incorporating cutting-edge technology and we must expand our NAVIC constellation, provide agile space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and ensure secure satellite-assisted communicationsโ€.

When we analyze the CDSโ€™s speech, there is a general assessment that the anti-satellite (ASAT) capability that India tested in 2019 is not enough of a deterrence against an adversary that has enhanced capabilities to destroy Indiaโ€™s space-based assets through non-kinetic capabilities like high powered laser, high powered microwaves, electromagnetic pulse, jamming, and spoofing.

The role of commercial space in augmenting space warfare capabilities was specified by General Chauhan when he stated that โ€œas seen during the Russia-Ukraine conflict by SpaceX and Maxar, had unfolded a new area in the war on convergence. This combined with the intense race towards militarization of space has resulted in the battlespace becoming expanded and the very nature of warfare is at a major cusp of transformation.โ€

Indiaโ€™s Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) chief, Samir V. Kamat, specified that India needs to develop greater space situational awareness, resilient space systems, and better ISR capabilities. For this, he called upon collaborations with Indiaโ€™s private space sector and academia.

In October 2022, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi launched Mission DefSpace that called for private sector space companies to apply for 75 defense space challenges for indigenous development. This included the development of โ€œLaunch System, Satellite System, Communication & Payload System, Ground System, and Software System.โ€

The highlight of the launch was a push to โ€œliberalizing the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) policy to allow 74% FDI under the automatic routeโ€. India issued a Joint Doctrine in 2017, by Integrated Headquarters of the Integrated Defense Staff (HQ IDS), that views space
as a multi-domain operation. In Chapter VI of the joint doctrine titled โ€œConcepts of Military Power Applicationโ€, there is a section on space power that states:

Emergence of space power is analogous to conventional land, sea or air power that will mark it out as a โ€˜Revolution in Military Affairsโ€™. Space bestows immense force multiplication capability on the Armed Forces, and the dependence on space assets for military operations is rapidly increasing.

Currently, Indiaโ€™s space capabilities are mostly driven by civil and commercial requirements, and steps for exploitation of space for military applications are undertaken. Leveraging space power would include protection of our national space assets and exploitation of space to enable defense capabilities across the conflict spectrum.

The second role that arises in this context is one of strategic clarity, of whether India needs to issue and adopt a military space doctrine. This is perhaps necessary given the first requirement to stake Indiaโ€™s strategic position and capabilities when it comes to partnering at the level of the QUAD.

In the next five years, by 2028, the QUAD will transcend from being a partnership high on rhetoric to being called upon to provide real-time support, across all domains of land, sea, air, cyber and space, to ensure that the Indo-Pacific remains free and accessible to all nations. In this context, issuing a military space doctrine is in Indiaโ€™s and the QUADโ€™s strategic interest.

Articulating a New Vision

Issuing a military space doctrine matters because it offers a clear signal of Indiaโ€™s strategic posture in regard to its military forces to partner nations and adversaries. The military space doctrine signals intent and strategic posture that can augment interoperability, create common strategic threat assessments, and build space capacities that can take advantage of globally available technologies, especially with the three other members of the QUAD (U.S., Japan and Australia).

This kind of clear posture showcases Indiaโ€™s leadership, while at the same time offers clarity in regard to Indiaโ€™s position on responsible behavior in space, which includes regulations o space debris and space traffic management.

It also counts proximity operations, ASAT moratoriums, and the development of non-kinetic ASATs important for national security but which could also lead to destabilization of the international space governance structure. Indiaโ€™s position in these matters is vital given it is a major space-faring nation.

Moreover, Indiaโ€™s trajectory by 2060 may well be different, with New Delhi inheriting the leadership of the QUAD with the largest GDP and population. India needs to develop interoperability now, to take advantage and build the required strategic habits of assuming leadership with capabilities, institutions, and grand strategic posturing.

The military space doctrine signals intent and strategic posture that can augment interoperability, create common strategic threat assessments and build space capacities that can take advantage of globally available space technologies especially with the three other members of the QUAD (U.S., Japan and Australia)

A more active leadership position in the QUAD is likely to enhance Indiaโ€™s influence within other regional bodies like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and a more capable space program is likely to increase Indiaโ€™s influence across Africa and West Asia.

India should begin the process of establishing a space command structure that can operate within the other QUAD partner space command formats.

India could assign exchange officers at key locations within the USSF, JSDU, or the Australian Space Defence Command, including any strategic studies group and professional military education.

QUAD countries can collaborate on point-to-point sub-orbital transportation which will greatly lessen the time and assist in connectivity.

Such capabilities could result in a joint QUAD strategic space vision. In this, India can play a critical role given it offers clarity to the world regarding its civilian and military space posture.

Also Read: Demystifying GEOINT

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Namrata Goswami

Namrata Goswami, Ph.D. teaches space policy and international relations at the Thunderbird School of Global Management, Arizona State University and co-author of the book Scramble for the Skies: The Great Power Competition to Control the Resources of Outer Space.

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